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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Arthur Gene Schmierer pied guilty to two counts 
of internet enticement. On appeal, Mr. Schmierer asserts that the district court erred in 
denying his motion to correct an illegal sentence. Mr. Schmierer asserts that the 
prosecuting attorney had no authority to issue an amended superseding indictment 
which alleged a new crime (Count II) that was not charged in the original indictment and 
that was not an included offense of the crime initially charged by indictment. Thus, 
Mr. Schmierer asserts that charging instrument was insufficient to confer subject matter 
jurisdiction over Count II. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceeding§ 
In 2006, over the course of three days, Mr. Schmierer chatted online with a 
detective in Idaho who was posing as a 13 year old girl. (R., p.7.) Mr. Schmierer and 
the detective engaged in sexually explicit conversations and arranged to meet. 
(R., p.7.) When Mr. Schmierer arrived at the designated meeting place, he was 
arrested. (R., p.8.) 
The grand jury heard the testimony of Detective Matt Tucker, Detective Derrek 
Dofelmire, and Jennifer Perry. (1/21/09 Tr., p.2.) Detective Tucker testified that the 
reason a sting directed to Mr. Schmierer was set up was because he had received a tip 
regarding Mr. Schmierer from law enforcement in Utah.1 (1/21/09 G. Jury Tr., p.4, L.22 
- p.5, L.2.) Detective Dofelmire, posing as 13 year old Emily Kotter, initiated the online 
1 The substance of the tip was not presented to the grand jury, but Detective Tucker 
testified that they did obtain Mr. Schmierer's screen name from the authorities in Utah. 
(1/21/09 Tr., p.6, Ls.8-13.) 
1 
contact with Mr. Schmierer by adding him to the fictitious girl's "buddy list." (1/21/09 
Tr., p.14, Ls.5-25, p.24, Ls.3-5.) Emily Kotter purportedly was in Idaho-Detective 
Dofelmire told Mr. Schmierer that she was staying with her grandmother in Nampa. 
(1/21/09 Tr., p.23, Ls.21-22.) Jennifer Perry embodied the fictitious 13 year old Idaho 
girl on the telephone and arranged to meet with Mr. Schmierer. (1/21/09 Tr., p.28, 
Ls.13-21, p.34, Ls.8-25.) Mr. Schmierer showed up at the designated meeting place 
and was arrested. (1/21/09 Tr., p.36, L.14 - p.37, L.4.) Based on these facts, 
Mr. Schmierer was indicted by a grand jury for one count of enticement of a minor over 
the internet and one count of attempted lewd conduct with a minor under the age of 
sixteen for his explicit internet communications and his attempt to meet with the fictitious 
Emily Kotter. 2 (5/18/09 Tr., p.23, L.12-p.25, L.10; R., pp.27-29.) 
2 The Superseding Indictment accused Mr. Schmierer as follows: 
Count I 
That the defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about 
between January 6, 2009 and January 9, 2009, in the County of Canyon, 
State of Idaho, did knowingly use the internet to solicit, seduce, lure, 
persuade or entice by word or action or both, a person Defendant believes 
to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage in any 
sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of Chapter 
15, 61, or 66, Title 18, Idaho Code, and that the Defendant is at least 
eighteen (18) years old. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-1509A and 
against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
Count II 
That the Defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about the 9th 
day of January, 2009, in the County of Canyon, State of Idaho, did willfully 
and lewdly attempt to commit a lewd and/or lascivious act upon and/or 
with the body of a minor female, under the age of sixteen years, to wit: 
between the age of thirteen (13) and fourteen (14) years, by oral to genital 
and/or genital to genital contact with the intent to arouse, appeal to and/or 
gratify the lust, passion and/or sexual desire of the defendant and/or said 
minor child. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-306, 18-1508 and 
against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho. 
(R., pp.27-28.) 
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Pursuant to plea negotiations, at the change of plea hearing, the prosecutor filed 
an amended superseding indictment in which Count II, attempted lewd conduct, was 
struck and a charge of internet enticement was substituted, for conduct between 
Mr. Schmierer and a fictitious minor in Utah.3 (5/8/09 Tr., p.7, L.16 - p.9, L.8; 5/18/09 
Tr., p.21, L.18 - p.23, L.11; R., pp.49-51.) The Amended Superseding Indictment was 
signed only by the prosecutor, Erica Kallin.4 (R., pp.49-51.) 
Mr. Schmierer agreed to plead guilty pursuant to a I.C.R. 11 (f)(1 )(C) plea 
agreement, in which both parties and the district court agreed to be bound by the plea 
agreement. (R., pp.56-59.) The plea agreement provided that Mr. Schmierer would 
plead guilty to the two counts of internet enticement contained in an amended 
superseding indictment, and in exchange, no federal charges would be filed in relation 
to these two known instances of enticement. (5/8/09 Tr., p.12, Ls.9-12; R., pp.57, 59.) 
3 At Mr. Schmierer's sentencing hearing, the prosecutor explained the basis for Count II, 
and referred to it as "the count that arose through Utah." (5/18/09 Tr., p.21, Ls.20-25.) 
She advised the district court that the second count in the Amended Superseding 
Indictment was based on an investigation through the Perverted Justice Program, which 
is a program in which people get online and try to entice individuals, and further, that 
Mr. Schmierer believed he was corresponding with a minor in Utah. (5/18/09 Tr., p.21, 
L.20 - p.22. L.18.) 
4 The Amended Superseding Indictment altered Count II to charge Mr. Schmierer as 
follows: 
Count II 
That the defendant, ARTHUR G. SCHMIERER, on or about 
between November 22, 2008 and January 9, 2009, in the County of 
Canyon, State of Idaho, did knowingly use the internet to solicit, seduce, 
lure, persuade or entice by word or action or both, a person Defendant 
believes to be a minor child under the age of sixteen (16) years to engage 
in any sexual act with or against the child where such act is a violation of 
Chapter 15, 61, or 66, Title 18, Idaho Code, and that the Defendant is at 
least eighteen (18) years old. 
All of which is contrary to Idaho Code, Section 18-1509A and 
against the power, peace and dignity of the State of Idaho .. 
(R., p.50.) 
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The sentence set forth in the plea agreement was for five years fixed on each count, to 
be served consecutively, and the indeterminate portion of the sentence would be left to 
the district court's discretion.5 (5/8/09 Tr., p.11, Ls.16-25.) Mr. Schmierer also agreed 
to "waive any possible deficiencies in the original charging" as part of the plea 
agreement. (5/8/09 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-5; R., p.52.) 
Mr. Schmierer entered a conditional guilty plea to two counts of enticement.6 
(R., pp.52-58.) Mr. Schmierer was sentenced to periods of confinement of 10 years 
unified, with five years fixed, on each count, and the sentences were ordered to be 
served consecutively. (R., pp.66-67.) 
Two years later Mr. Schmierer filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence 
pursuant to I.C.R. 35. (R., pp.72-85.) Through his briefing, Mr. Schmierer argued that 
the Amended Superseding Indictment was improperly signed by the prosecutor instead 
of the grand jury foreperson. (R., pp.75-76.) Mr. Schmierer asserted that because the 
Amended Superseding Indictment charged a crime that was not an included offense 
under the original indictment, and it was signed by the prosecutor instead of the grand 
jury, it was invalid and thus failed to confer subject matter jurisdiction. (R., pp.75-77.) 
A hearing was held on Mr. Schmierer's motion. (See generally 2/5/13 Tr.) At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the district court denied the motion, finding that Mr. Schmierer 
waived any defects in the charging documents when he agreed to the plea agreement.7 
5 The plea agreement also stated that the sentences were to be concurrent with that in 
an unrelated 2008 case, in which Mr. Schmierer was convicted of being an accessory to 
injury to child. (5/18/09 Tr., p.22, Ls.1-4; R., pp.66-67.) 
6 The plea was conditioned on the district court's acceptance of the plea agreement and 
the court's agreement to implement the sentence as agreed on by the parties. iR., pp.56-58.) 
The district court found that Mr. Schmierer "agreed to waive any defects and just -
which was called an Amendment to Grand Jury Indictment. It essentially then became 
4 
(2/5/13 Tr., p.3, L.19 - p.4, L.15.) On February 14, 2013, the district court issued a 
written decision denying Mr. Schmierer's motion. (R., pp.107-109.) The district court 
ruled that where Mr. Schmierer "specifically waived any defects in the charging 
document," he could not now claim that his sentence was illegal. (R., p.108.) On 
February 11, 2013, Mr. Schmierer filed a Notice of Appeal.8 (R., pp.102-104.) 
a criminal Information rather than Indictment on that. The defendant knowingly waived 
that, waived any defects in the charging documents." (2/5/13 Tr., p.4, Ls.1-7.) 
8 Mr. Schmierer's Notice of Appeal was filed after the district court orally ruled on his 
I.C.R. 35 motion, but before the district court entered its written order denying 
Mr. Schmierer's motion. Therefore, his premature notice of appeal became valid on the 
date the order was entered. See I.AR. 17(e)(2) ("A notice of appeal filed from an 
appealable judgment or order before formal written entry of such document shall 
become valid upon the filing and the placing of the stamp of the clerk of the court on 
such appealable judgment or order without refilling the notice of appeal."). 
5 
ISSUE 
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Schmierer's !.C.R. 
sentence? 
6 
motion to correct an illegal 
ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 Motion To Correct An 
Illegal Sentence 
A. Introduction 
Mr. Schmierer asserts that the district court erred in denying his I.C.R. 35(a) 
motion to correct an illegal sentence erred, because the district court lacked subject 
matter jurisdiction over Count II, the charge of internet enticement of a fictitious minor in 
Utah. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because the Amended 
Superceding Indictment charged a crime that was not an included offense under the 
original indictment, and in fact was an entirely different incident, involving a different 
fictitious minor in Utah, than the facts voted on by the grand jury. 
B. Standard Of Review 
The question of whether the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction is a 
question of law that this Court reviews de nova. State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757 
(2004). Whether an information or indictment conforms to legal requirements is also a 
question of law that this Court reviews de nova. Id. The issue of whether the district 
court had subject matter jurisdiction over a case can be raised at any time, including for 
the first time on appeal or in a I.C.R. 35(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence. Id. at 
758; State v. Lute, 150 Idaho 837, 838-39 (2011) (holding that the court properly had 
jurisdiction to consider defendant's I.C.R. 35 motion to correct an illegal sentence). 
C. The District Court Erred In Denying Mr. Schmierer's I.C.R. 35 Motion Alleging An 
Illegal Sentence Because The Record In This Case Reveals That There Was No 
Subject Matter Jurisdiction As To The Second Count Of Internet Enticement 
Mr. Schmierer asserts that the record in this case establishes that the trial court 
was without subject matter jurisdiction to accept Mr. Schmierer's guilty plea, or sentence 
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him upon his conviction on Count II. Therefore, because the district court did not have 
subject matter jurisdiction as to Count II-the offense of internet enticement as alleged 
in the Superseding Amended Indictment this case-Mr. Schmierer asks that this Court 
reverse the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion and remand this case to 
the district court with instructions to vacate his conviction. See Lute, 150 Idaho at 840-
841. 
1. Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
Article I, section 8 of the Idaho Constitution provides "[n]o person shall be held to 
answer for any felony or criminal offense of any grade, unless on presentment or 
indictment of grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor. ... " 
''The indictment or information filed by the prosecutor is the jurisdictional 
instrument upon which a defendant stands trial." Jones, 140 Idaho at 757. It is the filing 
of an indictment or information that confers subject matter jurisdiction on the district 
court with regard to the charges contained therein. Id. In light of this, the district court's 
subject matter jurisdiction over the charges brought against the defendant is dependent 
upon the legal sufficiency of the indictment or information containing those charges. Id. 
at 758. 
"There may be two or more separate charges in a grand jury indictment, but each 
shall be voted upon separately by the grand jury." I.C.R. 6.6(b). Further, although the 
district court may permit a complaint, an information or indictment to be amended, the 
Idaho Criminal Rules only permit such amendment "if no additional or different offense 
is charged." I.C.R. 7(e). 
A charging document confers jurisdiction if it alleges that the defendant 
committed a criminal offense within the State of Idaho. State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 
8 
694, 708 (2009); State v. Jones, 140 Idaho 755, 757-58 (2004). The Idaho Supreme 
Court, in Jones, analyzed what constitutes a "legally sufficient" indictment or 
information. 140 Idaho at 758. The Jones Court held that there are two standards to 
consider: (1) whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient for the purposes 
of due process; and (2) whether an indictment or information is legally sufficient for the 
purpose of imparting jurisdiction. Id. The charging document satisfies due process 
when it contains factual specificity sufficient to inform a person of common 
understanding of what is intended and to shield against double jeopardy. Severson, 
147 Idaho at 708; State v. Olin, 153 Idaho 891,894 (2012). 
2. Mr. Schmierer Properly Challenged The Lack Of Subject Matter 
Jurisdiction As An Illegal Sentence 
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(b)(2) provides that some defenses must be raised prior to 
trial. Among these are "[d]efenses and objections based on defects in the complaint, 
indictment or information (other than it fails to show jurisdiction of the court or to charge 
an offense which objection shall be noticed by the court at any time during the 
pendency of the proceedings)." I.C.R. 12(b)(2); State v. Luke, 134 Idaho 294, 300 
(2000). Thus, only a failure to show jurisdiction or the failure to charge an offense 
cannot be waived and can be raised at any time. I.C.R. 12(b)(2); Luke, 134 Idaho at 
300. 
Idaho Criminal Rule 35(a) permits a district court to correct an illegal sentence at 
any time. State v. Clements, 148 Idaho 82, 84 (2009). "[T]he term 'illegal sentence' 
under I. C.R. 35 is narrowly interpreted as a sentence that is illegal from the face of the 
record, i.e., does not involve significant questions of fact or require an evidentiary 
hearing." Id. at 86. Generally, whether a sentence is illegal or was imposed in an illegal 
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fashion is a question of law, over which an appellate court exercises free review. Id. at 
84. 
In Lute, the Idaho Supreme Court held that the court properly had jurisdiction to 
consider Lute's I.C.R. 35 motion, even though it was filed nearly fifteen years after he 
was indicted for the offenses. 150 Idaho at 838-39. The Court found that in cases 
where it is apparent that there is an issue concerning subject matter jurisdiction, the 
Court has the authority to address that issue. Lute, 150 Idaho at 840. The Lute Court 
held that the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the defendant's 
case because the grand jury never issued a valid indictment. Id. at 841. Thus the Court 
reversed the district court's denial of the defendant's I R. 35 motion for correction of 
an illegal sentence and remanded the case with instructions to grant the I.C.R. 35 
motion and vacate the conviction. Id. 
Here, the first count of internet enticement in the Amended Superseding 
Indictment was the same as Count I in the Superseding Indictment; however, the 
second count of internet enticement contained in the Amended Superseding Indictment 
was apparently for previous communications with another law enforcement official 
pretending to be a minor in Utah. (5/18/09 Tr., p.21, L.20 - p.23, L.11.) The issue of 
whether the communications between Mr. Schmierer and the fictitious minor in Utah 
constituted a crime was never before the grand jury. (See generally 1/21/09 Tr.) Thus, 
the Amended Superseding Indictment was invalid as the issue of whether 
Mr. Schmierer could be charged with a crime based on his alleged internet contact with 
the fictitious minor in Utah was never before the grand jury. 
10 
3. Mr. Schmierer Could Not Waive The Lack Of Subject Matter Jurisdiction 
The plea agreement contained a provision in which Mr. Schmierer purportedly 
waived "any possible deficiencies in the original charging." (5/8/09 Tr., p.8, Ls.2-5.) It is 
unclear from this statement what exactly he was waiving, and the waiver was never 
clarified in subsequent hearings. (See, e.g., 5/18/09 Tr.) Thus we are left with what 
appears to be a waiver of defects to the original indictment, the appropriateness of 
which Mr. Schmierer is not challenging on appeal. On appeal, Mr. Schmierer is 
challenging only the Amended Superseding Indictment and asserts that the district court 
never had subject matter jurisdiction over Count II of the Amended Superseding 
Indictment. 
A waiver is a voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a right or privilege. 
See, e.g., State v. Lopez, 144 Idaho 349, 351 (Ct. App. 2007). However, a claim of 
subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived. State v. Armstrong, 146 Idaho 372 
(Ct. App. 2008); State v. Jakoski, 139 Idaho 352 (2003). In Armstrong, the Court of 
Appeals, relying on the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Jakoski, noted: "[A]n 
absence of subject matter jurisdiction is never waived and can be raised initially on 
appeal or even through a collateral attack on a judgment." Armstrong, 146 Idaho at 
377. The Anderson Court permitted the State to challenge an order from which there 
was no timely appeal and permitted the State to seek relief despite the fact that it had 
not filed a cross-appeal. Id. 
The Idaho Supreme Court has explained regarding subject matter jurisdiction: 
"Subject matter jurisdiction is the power to determine cases over a general 
type or class of dispute." Bach v. Miller, 144 Idaho 142, 145 (2007). The 
source of this power comes from Article V, Section 20, of the Idaho 
Constitution, which provides that district courts "shall have original 
jurisdiction in all cases, both at law and in equity, and such appellate 
jurisdiction as may be conferred by law." This issue is so fundamental to 
11 
the propriety of a court's actions, that m,:,11'1'"" jurisdiction 
never be waived or consented and a court has a sua sponte duty to 
ensure that it has subject matter jurisdiction over a case. See Idaho R. 
Civ. P. 12(g)(4). Furthermore, judgments and orders made without subject 
matter jurisdiction are void and "are subject to collateral attack, and are 
not entitled to recognition in other states under the full faith and credit 
clause of the United States Constitution." Sierra Life Ins. Co. v. Granata, 
99 Idaho 624, 626-27 ( 1978). This Court exercises free review over 
questions of jurisdiction. 
State v. Urrabazo, 150 Idaho 158, 163-64 (2010) (emphasis added) (abrogated on other 
grounds by Verska v. Saint Alphonsus Reg'/ Med. Ctr., 151 Idaho 889 (2011)). 
Jurisdictional defects in an indictment are not waived by the entry of a guilty plea. 
See State v. Byington, 135 Idaho 621, 632 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding that indictment was 
jurisdictionally defective where the State failed to state facts essential to establish the 
offense charged and such a jurisdictional defect could not be waived); see also State v. 
Grady, 89 Idaho 204, 200-12 (1965) (stating that "[e]ven though a plea of guilty was 
entered by the appellant ... , that does not bar him from raising jurisdictional defects in 
the information"). 
Thus, the district court erred when it relied upon Mr. Schmierer's waiver of "any 
possible deficiencies in charging" as its basis to deny Mr. Schmierer's motion to correct 
an illegal sentence because any waiver of subject matter jurisdiction was invalid. 
4. Because the Amended Superseding Indictment Charges Mr. Schmierer 
With A New Crime, It Is A Nullity And Mr. Schmierer's Conviction Is Void 
In his motion to correct an illegal sentence, Mr. Schmierer asserted that the 
indictment failed to impart jurisdiction "[b]ecause the amended indictment charged a 
different crime under Count II than the crime charged in the original indictment." 
(R., p.75.) Count II was a new charge and the facts comprising this charge were never 
put before the grand jury. Thus, the Amended Superseding Indictment filed in this case 
12 
was invalid as the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over 
Mr. Schmierer's case regarding the second count of internet enticement. This charge 
must therefore be dismissed and Mr. Schmierer's conviction declared void. 
In State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808 (1967), the Idaho Supreme Court held as 
follows: 
An accused is denied, therefore, his constitutional right to a preliminary 
hearing where an information is filed or subsequently amended charging 
him with a crime of a greater degree or of a different nature than that for 
which he was held by the committing magistrate. 
It is, additionally, in this state, specifically provided by statute that a 
different and distinct offense may not be charged by way of amended 
information. I.C. § 19-1420. See, State v. Thompson [392 S.W.2d 617 
(Mo.1965).] 
State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho at 817-18 (footnote omitted). 
It is thus mandated, both statutorily and throughout Idaho's case law, that a new 
crime may not be charged simply by amending an indictment to include a new crime 
with distinctly different facts. State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 244, 249 (1990). 
In State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525 (2011), the defendant was indicted by a grand 
jury for the crime of lewd conduct. During the jury trial, the district court instructed the 
jury regarding the crime of lewd conduct and, as an included offense, the crime of 
sexual abuse of a child under sixteen. Id. at 526. The lewd conduct charge was based 
upon the allegation that Flegel touched the minor's vagina, and the sexual abuse 
charge was based upon evidence that he also touched her buttocks. The jury found 
Flegel not guilty of lewd conduct, but could not reach a verdict on the sexual abuse 
charge. Without resubmitting the matter to a grand jury, the State filed an amended 
indictment charging Flegel with one count of sexual abuse. Flegel was then tried by a 
jury on that charge and found guilty. Id. 
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The Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the judgment and remanded the case for a 
new trial. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526. The Idaho Supreme Court granted the State's 
petition for review and held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over 
the sexual abuse charge. Id. at 526. The Court held that, because sexual abuse is not 
a lesser included offense of lewd conduct, Flegel could only have been validly charged 
by indictment if the matter was resubmitted to a grand jury and it returned an amended 
indictment for sexual abuse. Id. The Court further held, "[t]he prosecuting attorney had 
no authority to issue an amended indictment for a crime that was not an included 
offense of that crime." Id. The Court found that Flegel's conviction was void and the 
judgment must be vacated and the case dismissed. Id. at 526. 
In crafting its holding, the Flegel Court first set forth the statutory and 
constitutional basis underlying its decision: 
Article I, Section 8 of the Idaho Constitution states that "[n]o person shall 
be held to answer for any felony ... unless on presentment or indictment 
of a grand jury or on information of the public prosecutor, after a 
commitment by a magistrate .... " Because a felony can only be 
prosecuted by an indictment found by a grand jury or by an information 
based upon the commitment of a magistrate (following a preliminary 
hearing or its waiver), Idaho Code section 19-1420 provides: "An 
information or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense 
other than that for which the defendant has been held to answer." To 
allow a prosecutor to amend an indictment to charge an offense other than 
that for which the defendant was held to answer would permit the 
prosecutor to, in essence, become the grand jury. 
Flegel, 151 Idaho at 526-27. The Flegel Court went on to analyze whether the sexual 
assault was a lesser included offense of lewd conduct, ultimately finding that sexual 
abuse was not a lesser included offense of lewd conduct. Id. at 527-29. 
Here, it is not necessary to analyze whether one of the two crimes Mr. Schmierer 
pied guilty to was a lesser included offense of the other crime, because the new crime 
that was charged by "amended indictment" was an entirely new crime-one that was 
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never before the grand jury. (See 1/21/09 Tr.) In his motion to correct an illegal 
Mr. Schmierer asserted that the indictment failed to impart jurisdiction 
"[b]ecause the amended indictment charged a different crime under Count II than the 
crime charged in the original indictment." (R., p.75.) Idaho Code§ 19-1401 provides, 
"An indictment cannot be found without the concurrence of at least twelve (12) grand 
jurors." No grand jurors concurred in Count II of the Amended Superseding Indictment. 
The Court held in Flegel, as it should in this case, "[b]ecause the amended indictment 
charged a different crime than the crime charged in the original indictment, the 
amended indictment is a nullity." Id. at 530. Further, the Flegel Court held as to the 
remedy in that case: 
Not having been issued by a grand jury, the amended indictment was 
invalid, the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over Flegel's 
case regarding the charge of Sexual Abuse, and this case must therefore 
be dismissed. 
Id. at 531. 
Similarly, the Amended Superseding Indictment filed in this case was invalid; 
thus the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over the second count of 
internet enticement and this charge must therefore be dismissed and Mr. Schmierer's 
conviction declared void. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Schmierer respectfully requests that this Court remand his case to the district 
court with instructions to vacate his judgment of conviction and sentence for Count II 
because the district court never had subject matter jurisdiction over this charge. 
DATED this 11 th day of February, 2014. 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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